Farhad Taheri Ardakani; Siavash Bayat Sarmadi
Abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a group of parties to compute a function on their private inputs securely. Classic MPC protocols for two parties use either Yao's garbled circuit (GC) or the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) protocol. In this paper, we propose MISC, a multi-input secure computation ...
Read More
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a group of parties to compute a function on their private inputs securely. Classic MPC protocols for two parties use either Yao's garbled circuit (GC) or the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) protocol. In this paper, we propose MISC, a multi-input secure computation protocol, by combining GC and GMW in a novel way. MISC can evaluate multi-input AND gates, which can reduce the round complexity. Moreover, MISC reduces the communication overhead by 1.7x and 2.4x for 2-input and by 2x and 2.8x for 4-input AND gates compared to the state-of-the-art GMW-style and GC-style protocols, respectively. In order to use the MISC efficiently in different applications, we redesign common building block with multi-input AND gates such as Equality checking, Maxpool, Comparison, and Argmax/Argmin. Results on privacy-preserving applications, e.g., circuit-based private set intersection (PSI) and private machine learning (CNN inference) show that compared to GMW, MISC improves the total communication overhead by 3x and the total run time by 1.5x.
Mohammad Erfan Mazaheri; Siavash Bayat Sarmadi; Farhad Taheri Ardakani
Abstract
Side-channel attacks are a group of powerful attacks in hardware security that exploit the deficiencies in the implementation of systems. Timing side-channel attacks are one of the main side-channel attack categories that use the time difference of running an operation in different states. Many powerful ...
Read More
Side-channel attacks are a group of powerful attacks in hardware security that exploit the deficiencies in the implementation of systems. Timing side-channel attacks are one of the main side-channel attack categories that use the time difference of running an operation in different states. Many powerful attacks can be classified into this type of attack, including cache attacks. The limitation of these attacks is the need to run the spy program on the victim's system. Various studies have tried to overcome this limitation by implementing these attacks remotely on JavaScript and WebAssembly. This paper provides the first comprehensive evaluation of timing side-channel attacks on JavaScript and investigates challenges and countermeasures to overcome these attacks. Moreover, by investigating the countermeasures and their strengths and weaknesses, we introduce a detection-based approach, called Lurking Eyes. Our approach has the least reduction in the performance of JavaScript and WebAssembly. The evaluation results show that the Lurking eyes have an accuracy of 0.998, precision of 0.983, and F-measure of 0.983. Considering these values and no limitations, this method can be introduced as an effective way to counter timing side-channel attacks on JavaScript and WebAssembly. Also, we provide a new accurate timer, named Eagle timer, based on WebAssembly memory for implementing these attacks.
Nastaran Shekofte; Siavash Bayat Sarmadi; hatameh Mosanaei Boorani
Abstract
Hardware Trojans have emerged as a major concern for integrated circuits in recent years. As a result, detecting Trojans has become an important issue in critical applications, such as finance and health. The Trojan detection methods are mainly categorized ...
Read More
Hardware Trojans have emerged as a major concern for integrated circuits in recent years. As a result, detecting Trojans has become an important issue in critical applications, such as finance and health. The Trojan detection methods are mainly categorized into functional and side channel based ones. To increase the capability of both mentioned detection methods, one can increase the transition activity of the circuit. This paper proposes a trusted platform for detecting Trojans in FPGA bitstreams. The proposed methodology takes advantage of increased Trojan activation, caused by transition aware partitioning of the circuit. Meanwhile, it benefits partial reconfiguration feature of FPGAs to reduce area overhead. Experimental studies on the mapped version of s38417 ISCAS89 benchmark show that for the transition probability thresholds of 10^{-4} and 2*10^{-5}, our method increases the ratio of the number of transitions (TCTCR) in the Trojan circuit by about 290.93% and 131.48%, respectively, compared to the unpartitioned circuit. Similar experiments on s15850 for the transition probability thresholds of 10^{-4} and 2*10^{-5} show an increase of 290.26% and 203.11% in TCTCR, respectively. Furthermore, this method improves the functional Trojan detection capability due to a significant increase in the ratio of observing wrong results in primary outputs.